

The Dynamics of the 2024 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election: Political Competition, Electoral Challenges, and Democratic Prospects

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Article Info	Abstract
Received: 23-12-2024 Accepted: 05-03-2025 Published: 17-04-2025 Keywords: Dynamics; Regional Election; Democracy.	This study examines the dynamics of the 2024 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada). The focus is on the complex competition between political parties and candidates, as well as the winning strategy of the candidate pair Pramono Anung and Rano Karno in the 2024 Jakarta Pilkada. Based on the dynamics and controversies surrounding the 2024 Jakarta Pilkada, this research aims to assess the prospects for democracy in the organization of the Jakarta Pilkada in general, based on the indicators of good electoral governance. This paper uses a normative legal research method with secondary data collection techniques through literature studies. The findings of this study show that the Jakarta Pilkada was conducted democratically as it implemented the indicators of good electoral governance. However, these indicators have not been fully implemented, such as the low participation of Jakarta residents in the 2024 Pilkada, the proper distribution of Form C6, and the misinformation spread by the General Election Commission (KPU) regarding the quick count survey results and the Sirekap system, which caused public confusion. This article is expected to provide in-depth insights for readers on the dynamics of the 2024 Jakarta Pilkada. Furthermore, this study is also intended to serve as an evaluation and reflection for stakeholders to improve the organization of future Pilkada that is more democratic and accountable.
Info Artikel	Abstrak
Kata Kunci: Dinamika; Pilkada; Demokrasi.	Penelitian ini mengulas dinamika Pilkada Jakarta tahun 2024. Fokusnya adalah pada dinamika persaingan yang cukup kompleks antara partai politik dan pasangan calon, serta strategi kemenangan pasangan Pramono Anung dan Rano Karno pada Pilkada Jakarta tahun 2024. Berangkat dari dinamika dan polemik Pilkada Jakarta 2024, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji prospek demokrasi pada penyelenggaraan Pilkada Jakarta secara umum berdasarkan indikator <i>good electoral governance</i> . Tulisan ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data sekunder melalui studi pustaka. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Pilkada Jakarta berlangsung secara demokratis karena telah mengimplementasikan indikator <i>good electoral governance</i> . Meskipun

demikian, indikator-indikator tersebut belum terimplementasi dengan sempurna, seperti rendahnya partisipasi masyarakat Jakarta pada Pilkada Jakarta tahun 2024, formulir C6 yang terdistribusi dengan baik, serta disinformasi yang dilakukan oleh KPU terkait hasil survei quick count dan Sirekap yang menimbulkan kebingungan publik. Artikel ini diharapkan dapat memberikan wawasan mendalam bagi pembaca tentang dinamika Pilkada Jakarta tahun 2024. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga diharapkan dapat menjadi bahan evaluasi dan refleksi bagi para stakeholders dalam meningkatkan penyelenggaraan Pilkada yang lebih demokratis dan akuntabel di masa depan.



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INTRODUCTION

The 2024 Regional Head Elections (*Pilkada*) are part of a series of simultaneous local elections that have been conducted over the past several years. Since their initial implementation in 2015, the number of participating regions in these concurrent elections has steadily increased. According to data reported by the General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*, KPU), a total of 545 regions across Indonesia are set to participate in the 2024 simultaneous *Pilkada*, comprising 37 provinces and 508 regencies/municipalities. The Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*, DIY) is the only province not participating in the 2024 *Pilkada*, due to the fact that its regional leadership—namely, the Governor and Vice Governor—is appointed rather than elected. (Wibawana, 2024).

Within the five-week period following the commencement of the 2024 *Pilkada* campaign on 25 September 2024, the Indonesian Election Supervisory Body (*Badan Pengawas Pemilu*, Bawaslu) received at least 1,620 public reports and 351 findings concerning alleged electoral violations. Subsequently, Bawaslu carried out a registration process to screen these submissions based on formal and material requirements. As a result, only 750 reports and 346 findings passed the registration stage, totaling 1,096 verified allegations of *Pilkada* violations recorded in Bawaslu's system. Following registration, Bawaslu conducted further verification to assess the validity of the data. Relevant parties—including the complainant, the reported individual, and witnesses—were summoned to provide clarification. Based on this verification, Bawaslu concluded that 498 out of the 1,096 cases constituted violations, while 506 did not (Alfitria Nefi P, 2024). However, after recalculating the verified data, the author identified a discrepancy: 92 cases appear to be missing, and no official explanation has been provided regarding their absence.

In addition, Bawaslu also outlined several emerging trends in administrative violations during the 2024 *Pilkada*. These violations include conducting campaign activities without submitting prior written notification, installing campaign materials (*Alat Peraga Kampanye*, APK) outside of designated areas, and public officials—both at the national and regional levels—engaging in campaign activities without taking official leave. Such violations have been committed across various regions by both *Pilkada* candidates and election organizers. (Alfitria Nefi P, 2024).

The Regional Head Election (*Pilkada*) is a periodic political event held in Indonesia to elect regional leaders, including governors, regents, and mayors. *Pilkada* is regarded as a crucial political agenda, as it involves political competition between parties and candidates vying for leadership positions. As such, the outcomes of *Pilkada* have the potential to influence the political direction of a region and exert a significant impact on the socio-economic and political life of its constituents.

During the *Pilkada* process, political parties and candidates engage in political campaigns to introduce and promote their programs and visions to the public. These efforts are intended to win the hearts and trust of the electorate and to present themselves as the most capable candidates to lead the region. This underscores the critical role of public participation in the electoral process, prompting political parties and candidates to compete vigorously for voters' attention. However, in pursuit of public favor, some parties and candidates resort to unethical practices, such as vote-buying, political violence, and intimidation of opponents. These practices often mar the *Pilkada* process and undermine its integrity as a democratic institution (Rizal, 2022).

Political contests at both the national and regional levels—particularly regional head elections such as gubernatorial races in Indonesia—have become a focal point of interest among scholars and political practitioners, especially in examining the complexities of socio-political phenomena (Harsono, 2023). Jakarta, as the Special Capital Region, possesses unique characteristics in every Regional Head Election (*Pilkada*) it conducts. Previous studies have shown that factors such as identity politics (Jukari et al., 2023), the involvement of national political actors, and the role of the media significantly influence voter preference (Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, 2019). Political dynamics in Indonesia are frequently shaped by identity politics, which are often employed during electoral campaigns (Muhtadi, 2019) particularly in highly diverse regions such as Jakarta (Lim, 2017). This helps

explain why religious and ethnic sentiments have played a decisive role in previous Jakarta *Pilkada*, especially during the 2017 election period (Mujani, 2007).

In addition, the dynamics of political parties serve as a key element in Jakarta's electoral contests, particularly in relation to tensions between nationalist and religious-oriented parties (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2020). Political parties in Indonesia tend to use *Pilkada* as a strategic arena to consolidate their national standing, often positioning Jakarta as the central stage for such efforts (Mietzner, 2015). Meanwhile, the role of social media in the 2024 Jakarta *Pilkada* is expected to be increasingly influential, as digital platforms have become primary tools for mobilizing voter support—both through the dissemination of information and the spread of disinformation (Digital, D., & Joseph, 2019).

On the other hand, challenges in the implementation of *Pilkada* have also drawn attention, particularly concerning the need to strengthen the quality of local democracy (Haridison, 2022). This underscores the importance of regulatory reform and enhanced oversight mechanisms to prevent common electoral malpractices, such as vote-buying and other violations (Simatupang, 2018). In the context of Jakarta's 2024 *Pilkada*, increasingly fragmented political dynamics and the pressing need to ensure inclusivity and transparency have emerged as critical issues (Okthariza, 2020). Therefore, this study is significant in contributing both empirical and theoretical insights to the discourse on local democracy in Indonesia, while also promoting more robust and accountable electoral governance.

Research on *Pilkada* is not a new topic, as numerous studies have already explored various aspects of the elections. One such study is conducted by Akhmad Rizal, which examines the dynamics, urgency, and challenges in the implementation of the 2024 simultaneous regional elections (*Pemilukada Serentak*). This paper emphasizes the need for strict and effective oversight to ensure that the *Pilkada* process is fair and democratic.

Idil Akbar's research, titled *Pilkada Serentak dan Geliat Dinamika Politik dan Pemerintahan Lokal Indonesia*, assesses how local political dynamics and governance unfold in the context of simultaneous *Pilkada*. The study examines two key aspects: first, to what extent democratization at the local level is effectively implemented, not only in terms of participation but also in the power relations established, which stem from the principle of popular sovereignty. Second, it evaluates how the outcomes of *Pilkada* are expected to lead the community toward improved social, political, and economic conditions.

Dina Lestari's study, titled *Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017: Dinamika Politik Identitas di Indonesia*, concludes that the victory of the gubernatorial candidate pair Anies Baswedan and

Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno in the 2017 Jakarta *Pilkada*, with the highest number of votes, demonstrates that identity politics was successfully used as a tool to garner sympathy or attract voters' attention to a candidate with a shared identity background (Lestari, 2019).

This study aims to fill the gap in previous research by focusing on the 2024 Jakarta *Pilkada* as a case study that represents the complexities of urban regional politics in Indonesia. Specifically, the author seeks to present three main discussions in this article. First, an overview of the political dynamics and competition during the 2024 Jakarta *Pilkada*. Second, an analysis of the winning strategies employed by the candidate pair Pramono Anung and Rano Karno in the 2024 Jakarta *Pilkada*, and their impact on voter perceptions. Third, a comprehensive analysis of the prospects for democracy in the 2024 Jakarta *Pilkada*, based on indicators of good electoral governance. Additionally, this research is expected to evaluate and provide recommendations for improving and enhancing the quality of democracy and the administration of elections and *Pilkada* in the future.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research employs a normative legal research method. As explained by Philipus Hadjon (Hadjon, 1997) and cited by Bachtiar, this approach aims to discover and interpret new legal arguments by considering relevant facts related to the issues under examination (Bachtiar, 2018). Normative legal research focuses on studying positive legal norms as its main subject. In this study, law is not viewed merely as a utopian concept but as norms, principles, and legal institutions that are established and documented. This type of research is also known as dogmatic legal research, which aims to analyze, preserve, and enrich the structure of positive law with robust logic. The approaches used in this study include the statutory approach and the case approach.

The data collection technique in this research is carried out using secondary data collection through a literature study, which involves searching, reviewing literature, and gathering specific written data from legal materials such as records, books, articles, and previous research findings (Miles, 1994). The data analysis employed by the author in this research is qualitative data analysis. Qualitative analysis can be conducted by examining and analyzing legislation or regulations, as well as articles related to the issue of the *Pilkada* in the Special Region of Jakarta. The results of the analysis are then presented in narrative form, followed by drawing conclusions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Regional Election (Pilkada) According to Law No. 10 of 2016 and Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024

The *Pilkada* is fundamentally a mechanism for the people to elect the best leaders for themselves and their regions. Through the *Pilkada*, the public places their hopes in the emergence of regional leaders capable of meeting the expectations of the majority, accelerating regional economic growth, improving welfare, and preserving the dignity of the people. These expectations and hopes demand significant changes, which are realized through policies that are people-centered and pro-people (Idil Akbar, 2016).

The *Pilkada* was first held in June 2005 as a result of the implementation of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government. Since then, *Pilkada* has become a vital component of democracy, providing the people with the opportunity to directly elect their regional leaders. Over more than a decade of its implementation, *Pilkada* in Indonesia has undergone significant developments and changes, both in terms of its execution system and the regulations governing it.

The regulations regarding *Pilkada* are governed by Law No. 10 of 2016, which is the Second Amendment to Law No. 1 of 2015 concerning the Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors into Law. The enactment of this law serves as a correction to the deficiencies in previous regulations and is also an effort to improve the implementation of direct *Pilkada* elections.

According to Article 7 of Law No. 10 of 2016, every Indonesian citizen has the right to equal opportunities to nominate themselves and be nominated as candidates for Governor and Deputy Governor, Regent and Deputy Regent, as well as Mayor and Deputy Mayor. Any citizen who meets the requirements may register as a candidate in the *Pilkada*.

Further provisions are outlined in Article 40 of Law No. 10 of 2016, which regulates the nomination of candidates by political parties in the *Pilkada* contest. Article 40, paragraph 1 states that a political party or coalition of political parties may register a pair of candidates if they meet the requirement of securing at least 20% (twenty percent) of the total seats in the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) or 25% (twenty-five percent) of the total valid votes in the general election and the DPRD election in the

respective region. Additionally, political parties that register candidates in accordance with this provision must be legally recognized in accordance with the prevailing regulations.

Interestingly, Article 40, paragraph (1) of Law No. 10 of 2016 has been declared conditionally unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in its Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024. This began when the Labour Party and the Gelora Party filed a lawsuit challenging this article before the Constitutional Court, seeking a ruling that the article was in conflict with the 1945 Constitution. The Labour Party and Gelora Party requested that the Constitutional Court allow political parties that do not have seats in the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) to still be eligible to nominate candidates for regional leadership.

The Constitutional Court ruled that the nomination threshold for regional leaders by political parties should be aligned with the nomination threshold for independent or non-party candidates, as outlined in Articles 41 and 42 of Law No. 10 of 2016, which is the Second Amendment to Law No. 1 of 2015 regarding the Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors (Vitorio Mantalean, 2024).

The reading of article 41 number 1 letter (c) is as follows: (Law Number 10 of 2016 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors into Law, n.d.)

- (1) Individual candidates can register as Candidates for Governor and Deputy Governor Candidates if they meet the requirements for support for the number of residents who have the right to vote and are included in the permanent voter list in the last general election or previous election in the area concerned, with the following provisions:
 - a. *Provinces with a population of up to 2,000,000 (two million) people must be supported by at least 10% (one half percent);*
 - b. *Provinces with a population of more than 2,000,000 (two million) people up to 6,000,000 (six million) people must be supported by at least 8.5% (eight and a half percent);*
 - c. *Provinces with a population of more than 6,000,000 (six million) people up to 12,000,000 (twelve million) people must be supported by at least 7.5% (seven and a half percent).*
 - d. *provinces with a population of more than 12,000,000 (twelve million) inhabitants must be supported by at least 6.5% (six and a half percent); and*
 - e. *The amount of support as referred to in letters a, b, c, and d is spread over more than 50% (fifty percent) of the number of districts/ cities in the province in question.*

Based on this decision, the way for political parties with low vote capital to carry a gubernatorial candidate is wide open, and with this decision it also indirectly opens the way or opportunity for new figures to appear and contest in the 2024 Regional Elections.

Dynamics of the 2024 Jakarta Special Region Elections

The Special Capital Region of Jakarta is among the regions participating in the simultaneous regional elections (Pilkada) of 2024. Three pairs of gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates (commonly referred to as "paslon") have officially been nominated to contest the Jakarta election. They are: candidate pair number 1, Ridwan Kamil–Suswono; candidate pair number 2, Dharma Pongrekun–Kun Wardana Abiyoto; and candidate pair number 3, Pramono Agung–Rano Karno (Salsabila, 2024). The nomination of these three candidate pairs has brought notable dynamics to the 2024 Jakarta electoral race. Two of the pairs are running under political party coalitions, while one is contesting through an independent route. The table below presents the political party coalitions backing each gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pair (Khasanah, 2024).

Table.1 List of Supporting Political Parties in the 2024 Jakarta Regional Election

Cagub – Cawagub	Number of Supporting Parties	Supporting Political Parties
Pramono Anung – Rano Karno	2	PDI-P, Hanura
Ridwan Kamil – Suswono	15	Gerindra, PKS, Golkar, Demokratis, NasDem, PSI, PKB, Gelora, PBB, Perindo, PAN, PPP, Prima, PKN, Garuda
Dharma Kamil – Kun Wardana Abiyoto	-	Individual (677.065 Voice of Community Support)

Source: CNBC Indonesia

While the 2017 Jakarta regional election was marked by the politicization of identity, the 2024 Jakarta election has been shaped by a different controversy—namely, the scenario of running against an "empty box" (i.e., a race with only one candidate pair). This issue first emerged when candidate pair number 1, Ridwan Kamil–Suswono, received backing from 15 political parties, as outlined in the table above. The discourse gained further traction due to an electoral regulation that allows a party or coalition to nominate candidates as long as they control at least 20% of the seats in the regional parliament. When calculated, these 15 parties collectively hold 91 out of 106 seats in the Jakarta

Regional House of Representatives (DPRD Jakarta). This ‘oversized’ coalition significantly narrowed the chances for other candidates to enter the race, due to the lack of available parties capable of endorsing alternative contenders. This development directly affected Anies Baswedan, whose former backers in the 2024 presidential election—namely, the NasDem Party, the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)—shifted their support and joined the pro-Kamil coalition known as Koalisi Indonesia Maju (KIM) Plus, which endorses Ridwan Kamil–Suswono.

A brief moment of hope emerged for Anies Baswedan—who had run out of political party support to contest the Jakarta gubernatorial race—following the Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXI/2024. This ruling altered the candidacy threshold for regional head elections. According to the decision, the previously enforced nomination threshold of 20–25% was declared unconstitutional. In its place, a new, lower threshold was introduced, ranging from 6.5% to 10%, depending on the number of registered voters in each region.

In the context of the Jakarta regional election, and referring to Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024, the Special Capital Region of Jakarta—with a registered voter population of 8,214,007 (Rahmawati, 2024) —requires only 7.5% of the vote share from a political party or coalition of parties in the previous DPRD legislative election to nominate a gubernatorial candidate. This ruling reignited hope for Anies Baswedan to contest the Jakarta gubernatorial race. At the time, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), which had not yet declared its candidate, was reportedly considering nominating Anies Baswedan. However, in the final moments before the candidate registration period closed, PDI-P ultimately decided to nominate its own cadre—Pramono Agung and Rano Karno. This effectively closed all avenues for Anies Baswedan to participate in the 2024 Jakarta election.

A number of parties view the momentum of Anies Baswedan's failure to advance in the Jakarta Regional Election as an act of obstruction carried out by hands who do not like him. In fact, according to a survey by the Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC), Anies Baswedan received the support of Jakarta residents who reached 42.8%, 8% ahead when compared to Ridwan Kamil who got 34.9% (BBC News Indonesia, 2024).

Another significant development emerged from the independent gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pair, Dharma Pongrekun and Kun Wardana Abiyoto. Their candidacy drew public attention due to allegations of identity number (NIK) misuse

involving Jakarta residents' national ID cards (KTP). The Indonesian Association for Legal Aid and Human Rights (PBHI) reported receiving 205 complaints regarding the unauthorized use of KTP NIKs. It is suspected that these identity numbers were misused to bolster the required support for Dharma Pongrekun and Kun Wardana Abiyoto's independent candidacy in the Jakarta election.

Carlos Paath, Head of the Technical Division of the East Jakarta General Elections Commission (KPU), claimed that his office had verified the submitted support documents. However, during the verification process, several individuals whose data appeared in the submission claimed they had never given their support. Based on these inconsistencies, the Provincial KPU of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta concluded that the data submitted did not meet the eligibility requirements (Agne, 2024).

To be able to run as a pair of independent candidates for governor and deputy governor in the 2024 Jakarta Regional Election, it is known that they must have at least 618,968 citizen support. Dharma Pongrekun and Wardana Abiyoto were declared unsuccessful because of the 1,229,777 support data uploaded on the Candidacy Information System (Silon), as many as 447,469 were declared eligible (MS) and 782,308 were ineligible (TMS). However, in the end, Dharma Pongrekun and Wardana Abiyoto were declared to have passed the administrative verification stage for the improvement of independent governor candidates and deputy governor candidates in the Jakarta Regional Election by pocketing 721,221 support from Jakarta residents (CNN Indonesia, 2024).

Pramono Anung and Rano Karno Victory Strategy

After navigating a series of political dynamics—from the registration phase, through the campaign period, to the final vote count—the Jakarta General Elections Commission (KPU) officially announced the final results of the 2024 Jakarta regional election on December 8, 2024. Candidate pair number 3, Pramono Anung and Rano Karno, was officially declared the winner, securing the highest vote share at 50.07%, surpassing the other two contenders, Ridwan Kamil–Suswono and Dharma Pongrekun–Kun Wardana. The winning pair garnered 2,183,239 votes out of a total of 4,360,629 valid ballots counted across the entire Special Capital Region of Jakarta, including the Thousand Islands District.

The victory of Pramono Anung and Rano Karno in the 2024 Jakarta election was largely attributed to their campaign strategy, which focused on local Betawi cultural issues

and broader community-centered concerns. Their policy platform—emphasizing practical solutions to transportation, flooding, and education—resonated strongly with voters, particularly in urban areas facing complex infrastructural challenges. The following table presents the vote distribution for each gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pair in the Jakarta regional election (Regar, 2024).

Table 2. Data on Vote Acquisition in the 2024 Jakarta Regional Election

Candidate Pairs	Electoral Area/Administrative City					
	Kepulauan Seribu	Central Jakarta	East Jakarta	South Jakarta	West Jakarta	North Jakarta
Ridwan Kamil-Suswono	6.578 voice	152.234 voice	535.613 voice	375.391 voice	386.880 voice	261.463 voice
Dharma Pongrekun-Kun wardana	653 voice	44.856 voice	136.935 voice	90.294 voice	109.457 voice	77.026 voice
Pramono Anung-Rano Karno	7.456 voice	220.372 voice	635.170 voice	491.017 voice	500.738 voice	328.486 voice

SourceSource: Tempo.co

If you look at the data on the votes of the 2024 Jakarta gubernatorial pair in the table above, it can be seen that the number 3 candidate pair, Pramono Anung and Rano Karno, won by a landslide by pocketing the highest votes in each administrative city. Of course, this can only be obtained with careful preparation and strategies to attract the attention and voice of the people of Jakarta. Based on searches conducted on various information media, the following are the strategies used by the Pramono and Rano couple to win the 2024 Jakarta Regional Election.

1. Consistent blusukan greets the residents of Jakarta

Paslon number 3 prioritizes blusukan dialogue to visit and greet Jakarta residents. It was through this blusukan activity that Pramono Anung and Rano Karno collected problems that developed in the community and absorbed existing aspirations. Based on the records of the Jakarta Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), Pramono Anung and Rano Karno are indeed one of the candidate pairs who carry out the most blusukan agendas compared to the other two candidate pairs (Fajriadi, 2024). Through this blusukan activity, Pramono Anung tries to build trust and establish closer closeness with the community by listening to the community's complaints about existing problems. The result is that the electability of Pramono Anung and Rano Karno has increased significantly since the beginning of the announcement of themselves as governor candidates.

2. Strategic communicator

During his time in politics, Pramono Anung was dubbed as the 'golden esophagus'. This is because Pramono Anung is considered a good political communicator who can be a middle way in bridging all parties, both from the opposition and within the party (Trengginas, 2024). Pramono Anung believes that one of the reasons he was chosen to advance in Jakarta by PDI Perjuangan is because he can be accepted by all parties, including the community. The proof is that Pramono can get support from two former governors of Jakarta, namely Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and Anies Baswedan. In addition, Pramono also said that he also received support from seven party politicians who are members of the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM) plus (Nurhaliza, 2024). This shows that Pramono is not only able to embrace and gain the support of various elements of society, ranging from ordinary people to political figures through his good communication skills

3. Creative and effective digital campaigns


Pramono Anung said that he did a creative and simple campaign style to introduce himself to young people, generation Z and millennials. This is considering that he has been a figure who has often worked behind the scenes, rarely highlighted by the media so that the people of Jakarta do not know him very well. Therefore, a unique and effective way is needed to make himself well known by the people of Jakarta, especially young people who currently dominate the permanent voter list in Jakarta, one of which is by conducting digital campaigns on various social media, such as Tiktok, Instagram and Youtube. In campaigning on social media, he is assisted by the Success Team, especially related to content on Tiktok social media. Through Tiktok, he admitted that he is more known by young people. In addition, according to him, a simple campaign style with terms and programs that can be understood by the public is one of the reasons why the electability of the pair of Pramono Anung and Rano Karno can overtake the other two candidate pairs (Fawdi, 2024).

4. Strategic coalition

In addition to combining the two major parties in his coalition, namely PDI-Perjuangan and Hanura, Pramono Anung and Rano Karno also received support from two former Jakarta Governors, Basuki Tjahaja Purnomo (Ahok) and Anies Baswedan. This is considering that the two former governors of Jakarta have a lot of and strong mass support in Jakarta because of their good image while serving there. The following

are the results of Alvira Research's survey on the electability of the Jakarta Regional Election candidate pairs.

Table 3. Results of the 2024 Jakarta Regional Election Governor-Cawagub Survey



The survey was conducted on November 17-22, 2024 after Anies Baswedan officially expressed his support for the couple Pramono Anung and Rano Karno on November 15, 2024. After declaring their support, Ahokers and Anies Volunteers, supporters of the two former Jakarta governors, also declared their support for the number 3 candidate pair. The success of Pramono and Rano in uniting the two large bases of supporters of Ahok and Anies is one of the factors that can increase their electability in the Jakarta Regional Election (Al-Fajri, 2024).

The Prospect of Democracy in the Implementation of the Jakarta Regional Elections

General Elections (Elections) as a competitive political center in the modern political era require the application of good governance principles in the management of its implementation. The urgency is the realization of a democratic election order and the public trust. The integral relationship between the implementation of good elections and the democratic process is called *electoral governance*. Thus, *electoral governance* is understood as an instrument used to assess whether the implementation of a country's elections runs in accordance with the principles of *good governance*.

Good governance is broadly interpreted as making and implementing policies that are guided by the legal system, respect for citizens' rights, efficient use of resources, and away from other corruptions (Kwaghg, 2013; Paters, 2010). The addition of the word *good* in *governance* so that it becomes *good governance* has a meaning, governance at all levels of national, provincial, district or city, and village governments, including all state institutions must be managed (*governed*) with proper *procedures* (Ali, 2013). Good governance is a government that practices professionalism, accountability, transparency, democracy, efficiency, effectiveness, law enforcement, and all things that can be accepted by the community in its governance (Santosa, 2017).

The relationship between *the good electoral governance* approach and public trust in the election is *that good electoral governance* improves the quality of the electoral *process* and realizes elections with integrity, both the integrity of the organizers, participants, voters, and the integrity of election results (Mozaffar, 2002). The political legitimacy of the elected government and the accountability of election organizers were born from election integrity. In the end, *good electoral governance* forms a positive public perception as an indicator of public trust in elections (Agus, 2023).

Meanwhile, if *good electoral governance practices* have not been effectively implemented, it can cause a number of impacts, such as a democratic recession, poor election administration which is characterized by high violations of election administration, and a bad image of the Election Organizing Institution (LPP) which is marked by the revelation of ethical violations of election organizers by the LPP.

Imperfect *good electoral governance practices* have the potential to cause non-criminalization in elections, calculations, recapitulations, or re-voting, and even re-elections. The repetition of these stages creates additional costs that must be disbursed by the state and gives birth to political instability. The momentum of the election, which is colored by a number of political violence, is caused by the lack of optimal *good electoral governance practices*. while *good electoral governance* can be a nutrient for the construction of democratic election governance (Agus, 2023).

Through the *good electoral governance* indicators that Agus has simplified, it is known that the most important *indicators of good electoral governance* are as follows: (Agus, 2023).

a. Election Transparency

Transparency, which also means openness, has three aspects; (a) there is an open policy on supervision; (b) there is access to information so that the public

can reach every aspect of policy; and (c) the application of the principle of check and balance between executive and legislative institutions or supervisory bodies (Sedarmayanti, 2010). Transparency is the most basic thing in election governance. Transparency in election management requires LPP to report every activity to *stakeholders* and the public .

b. Election Accessibility

Election accessibility means that there are facilities and facilities in obtaining access to elections, one of which is the disability group. Access to disability groups is the obligation of LPP in providing access to election information, sharing access that must be provided to disability groups such as the opportunity to become candidates for members of the DPR, DPD, and DPRD, as well as the opportunity to be an election organizer (Wall, Ellis, Ayoub, Rukambe, 2017).

c. Election Participation

Universally, participation is the process of involving the community, especially its aspirations in policy making or the formulation of plans made by the organization, also seen in the involvement of the community in the implementation of various organizational policies, including supervision and evaluation (Sedarmayanti, 2010). Specifically, participation in election governance is the obligation of LPP to provide participation to the wider community to be involved in the election process, such as discussing the election, checking their names on the voter list, and participating in voting at polling stations. In this case, community involvement can be presented by election *stakeholders* in the process of formulation, implementation, and evaluation and reporting of policies at the stages of the election. The measure of democracy in an election can be determined by how much of the role or participation of the community in determining which of these candidates is really worthy to lead (Akbar, 2016)

d. Professionalism of the Election Organizers

LPP's professionalism in organizing elections can be measured through a number of components, such as; the accuracy and accuracy of the work of LPP staff, the existence of core staff and temporary staff who are trained and competent in carrying out their work, integrity of core staff and temporary staff

(Alan Wall, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W. Dundas Joram Rukambe, 2017).

e. Election Accountability

Specifically, election accountability is defined as LPP is responsible for its own work and is obliged to submit its work report to stakeholders. The way of delivery includes; (1) conducting open meetings at each stage of the election with stakeholders; (2) conveying the results of the work through the election information system; (3) delivering announcements of work through the mass media. According to Wall, election accountability has a number of positive impacts such as increasing the democracy index and reducing election disputes between LPP and stakeholders, as well as building stakeholder trust in the organizers and implementation of elections.

In the context of the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections, which is the implementation of elections at the local level, the author will try to analyze whether the implementation of the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections has implemented indicators of *good electoral governance* in its implementation to be said to be a democratic Regional Election that applies the principles of *good governance*. As the most fundamental thing in the governance of the Regional Elections, transparency in the management of the Regional Elections requires the Jakarta KPU to report every activity and accurate information to *stakeholders* and the public, because this is the main key to building public trust. This effort was successfully carried out, as can be seen from the Jakarta KPU receiving appreciation and informative predicates for its commitment to carrying out public information disclosure by the DKI Jakarta Information Commission (Lestari, 2024). The recapitulation information system (Sirekap) is also a means for the KPU to realize transparency of the results of the Regional Elections to the public. So that the public can participate in supervising the vote counting process in the Jakarta Regional Elections.

The realization of convenience and facilities for ordinary citizens and residents with disabilities in gaining access to the Regional Elections has reflected the principle of accessibility in the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections. Both ordinary citizens and residents with disabilities can give their voting rights in the Regional Elections as long as they meet the requirements, the only difference is that voters with disabilities are given specificity to be accompanied by a companion in the election process. This companion can come from KPSS members or other people at the request of the voter concerned.

In terms of public participation in the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections, it can be seen from a number of forms, the voter participation rate was recorded at around 4.3 million votes. Meanwhile, the number of voter lists remains 8.2 million. This means that the participation rate of voters in the Jakarta Regional Election is relatively low because it is only at 50%. The low participation of the people of Jakarta is also related or sustainable to the level of professionalism of the Election Organizing Institution (LPP), in this context it is the Jakarta KPU. The author assesses that the professionalism of the Jakarta KPU can also be seen from how the Jakarta KPU performs in its duties.

In practice, the Jakarta KPU received a number of complaints from the public regarding its inaccuracy as the organizer of the Regional Elections. It is known that there are many C6 forms (notification letters) that do not reach the hands of residents who have the right to vote. Indeed, the C6 form is not fundamental in the implementation of the Regional Elections, because the lack of ownership of the C6 form does not make residents unable to participate in voting. However, for residents who do not have Form C6, there is a time limit to give their voting rights, namely from 12.00 to 13.00 (Azizah, 2024), in contrast to residents who have a C6 form who can give their voting rights from 07.00 to 13.00. This is suspected to have contributed to the low participation of Jakarta residents in this election. In addition, the credibility of the Jakarta KPU in handling information related to the results of the Regional Elections is also questioned by the public, this is because the Jakarta KPU labeled information from a survey institution that stated that one of the winning candidates based on the results *of the quick count* was disinformation. In fact, based on the results of the official calculation from the recapitulation information system (Sirekap) of the KPU, it shows that the candidate is superior by more than 50% of the votes (News Team, 2024). The question caused confusion among the public regarding the difference between the Jakarta KPU statement and the Sirekap data.

During the 2024 Regional Election process, the accountability of the KPU is one thing that will be highlighted by many parties because this is where public trust in the process and results of the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections will be built. Considering that the Jakarta Regional Elections steal a lot of public attention in every election, of course the Jakarta KPU has a kind of responsibility to report or convey every stage, process, and results to *stakeholders* and the public, both through meetings between the organizers of the Regional Elections and through the mass media. With the submission of work reports to

skateholders and the public, shortcomings and errors in the performance of the KPU can be evaluated directly by the authorities.

Although the practice *of good electoral governance* cannot be said to be perfect in the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections, at least criminal acts in the Regional Elections, calculations, recapitulations, or re-voting, even re-elections do not occur. However, it is undeniable that the democratic implementation of the Regional Elections is highly dependent on openness, accountability, and community participation in determining leaders who are representative and have integrity.

CONCLUSION

The 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections show complexity in terms of political strategy, regional election management, and social dynamics related to public trust. Three pairs of candidates for governor and deputy governor are vying for the number one seat in Jakarta, with dynamics driven by large coalitions of political parties, scenarios against empty boxes, and candidacy through independent channels. Ridwan Kamil and Suswono advanced through a grand coalition that included 15 political parties, utilizing a system that required candidates to get 20% of the seats in the DPRD to advance. Despite the presence of the Constitutional Court's decision that reduced the nomination threshold, Anies Baswedan was still unable to advance because PDI-Perjuangan chose to carry Pramono Anung and Rano Karno in the Jakarta Regional Election. Dharma Pongrekun and Kun Wardana Abiyoto, a pair of independent candidates, were involved in a controversy related to profiteering on Population Identification Numbers (NIK) to gain support, although they were eventually declared eligible after data corrections. Pramono Anung and Rano Karno's victory in the Jakarta Regional Election was driven by a series of effective strategies that focused on a direct approach to the community, good political communication skills, the use of digital campaigns to attract the voices of the younger generation, and a solid coalition. The combination of these strategies has succeeded in building a positive image and perception in the Jakarta community towards the number 3 candidate.

The implementation of the 2024 Jakarta Regional Elections can be said to be democratic because it has generally reflected the principles *of good electoral governance*, especially in terms of transparency and accessibility, which is reflected in the implementation of an information system that is open to the public and easy access for people with disabilities. However, there are several shortcomings that need to be corrected,

such as low public participation and problems in distributing the C6 form, as well as controversy over disinformation related to survey results that cause public confusion. Therefore, departing from the purpose of this research, there are several suggestions for improvement based on the principles of *good electoral governance* that the author can provide in order to improve the quality of democracy and better the implementation of the Regional Elections. *First*, increasing voter education. Seeing the low level of participation of the people of Jakarta in the Regional Elections, the KPU needs to provide more in-depth education on the importance of using voting rights in general elections. *Second*, improving the C6 form distribution system. Because this indirectly affects the level of public participation in the Jakarta Regional Elections, the KPU needs to improve the C6 form distribution system and ensure that the form reaches the voters. *Third*, the Jakarta KPU needs to strengthen its public communication strategy by providing clear and fast information to overcome disinformation issues related to the Regional Elections, because this greatly affects the level of public trust in the KPU.

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